The lifting of the major banks’ “foreclosure moratoriums” — which had been instituted to stem the outcry over massive fraud in the processing of foreclosure documents — demonstrates the necessity for the working class to launch a struggle to win a genuine two-year moratorium on foreclosures and evictions predicated on the premise that housing is a fundamental human right.

With the federal government having essentially nationalized the mortgage industry, the president has the authority to implement such a moratorium through executive action.

Bank of America on Oct. 18 announced its intent to resume foreclosures in the 23 states which have judicial foreclosures. BOA had suspended foreclosures in those states on Oct. 1 due to revelations of fraud in the processing of foreclosure documents. BOA also announced it would resume foreclosures in a few weeks in the remaining 27 states. This move will likely encourage JP Morgan Chase and GMAC, who had similarly suspended foreclosures in the 23 judicial foreclosure states, to resume taking people’s homes. (New York Times, Oct. 18)

Barbara J. Desoer, president of Bank of America Home Loans, stated, “We did a thorough review of the process and we found the facts underlying the decision to foreclose have been accurate. We paused while we were doing that, and now we’re moving forward.”

While even bourgeois commentators treated this announcement with the cynicism and derision it deserved, Bank of America was emboldened to make this move with the backing of the federal government.

From the onset of the exposure of massive bank fraud, the Obama administration has opposed any calls for a national moratorium on foreclosures. When David Axlerod, President Barack Obama’s chief advisor, appeared on CBS’s “Face the Nation” Oct. 10, he came out against a national moratorium. He was followed by Housing and Urban Development Secretary Shaun Donovan, who published an article Oct. 17 in the Huffington Post that also rejected calls for a national moratorium, saying it would hurt the economy.

Billions for banks

Bank of America noted that the major holders of its mortgages, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, had been consulted during the review and had signed off on the decision to resume foreclosures. Of 14 million mortgages BOA services, one-half of them — worth $2.1 trillion — are owned by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the giant mortgage holding companies controlled by the U.S. Treasury. (NYT, Oct. 18)

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were formerly government-sponsored enterprises, private corporations chartered by the federal government to give them enhanced standing to buy or back up mortgage loans.

However, in July 2008 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were taken over by the federal government due to massive losses they incurred as a result of the record rise in foreclosures caused by the fraudulent and predatory lending practices of the banks. The federal government placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in trusteeship under the Federal Housing Finance Administration, guaranteeing up to $200 billion in federal tax dollars to back up their loans. That figure was raised to $400 billion, and is now uncapped.

According to a June 3, 2009, statement by FHFA Director James Lockhart, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac own or guarantee 56 percent of single-family mortgages worth $5.4 trillion in the U.S. When combined with the Federal Housing Administration, the federal government backs or issues a whopping 75 percent of the country’s mortgages. (Associated Press, Sept. 9, 2008)

What this means is that when a borrower goes into foreclosure, the bank which made the loan gets paid off at the loan’s full value by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. In addition, the government pays the bank to process the foreclosure. Then the government takes over the home, evicts the homeowner and any tenants, places the home on the market, and sells it at a fraction of the loan’s value.

The difference in what the government paid the bank for the loan, and what the home sells for after foreclosure and eviction, is paid for by taxpayers. That arrangement amounts to a silent bailout of the banks.

For example, a home several doors from where this writer lives in Detroit sold for $137,000 in 2001. The home was then foreclosed and the loan was taken over by Fannie Mae. The home is now being listed by Fannie Mae for $31,000. The $99,000 difference between the $130,000 still owed on the home for which the bank received full value, and the $31,000 for which Fannie Mae is selling the home, is paid for out of taxpayer funds.

This bailout to the banks, which occurs with virtually every foreclosure, has already amounted to $145 billion.

While the FHFA estimated that the total cost of this bailout will be $221 to $363 billion, in 2009 the Congressional Budget Office estimated that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would require $389 billion in federal subsidies through 2019. (Bloomberg News, Oct. 21)

Barclays Capital Inc. analysts put the price tag as high as $500 billion, and Sean Egan, president of Egan-Jones Ratings Co., estimated that the total taxpayer bailout to the banks through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will total $1 trillion. (BN, June 13)

These figures do not include the additional hundreds of millions of dollars in federal subsidies on FHA-backed loans.

Still-soaring foreclosures, no relief for homeowners

The Obama administration has announced modest loan modification programs to help homeowners, such as the Home Affordable Modification Program, in exchange for this continued massive bailout.

HAMP and other programs are supposed to be mandatory for the banks. But the banks do not comply to help homeowners in any significant way. The government relies on the banks themselves to carry out these modifications, and the federal government and most courts have refused to enforce any sanctions for refusal to perform them.

With the banks knowing they will be getting paid full value on the loans after foreclosure, the banks have little incentive to modify loans and have sabotaged HAMP and led to the program’s virtual collapse. As of August less than one-sixth of the 3 million homeowners who were supposed to be helped have received loan modifications, and the number of borrowers being offered trial modifications has drastically declined. (NYT, Aug. 20)

It was recently exposed that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are using the same law firms that prepared the fraudulent documents for the major banks in their processing of foreclosures and evictions. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are sanctioning loan servicers if they do not toss people out of their homes within a short period of time. (NYT, Aug. 22)

Obama: Issue moratorium now!

Today the foreclosure crisis continues to intensify. An estimated 2.8 million foreclosures are projected across the U.S. during 2010, with foreclosures totaling 9 million for the years 2009 to 2012. The total lost home-equity wealth due to foreclosures is expected to be $1.9 trillion for the years 2009 to 2012. (Center for Responsible Lending, Aug. 20)

Foreclosures and evictions are a direct product of persistent high unemployment. Of the 1 million homeowners who received foreclosure counseling through the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program, 58 percent listed unemployment as the main reason for default. (HousingWire, June 1)

With the federal government controlling or backing the vast majority of mortgage loans, President Obama has the clear authority to implement a two-year moratorium on foreclosures and foreclosure-related evictions through an executive order.

A moratorium would let homeowners and tenants remain in their homes, stabilize communities and allow time to develop a long-term solution to this crisis. Then home loans could be restored to their proper value and housing for all guaranteed.

We must fight each foreclosure and eviction and begin implementing such a moratorium through direct action. During the Depression of the 1930s, move-ins reversed many evictions and led to foreclosure moratoriums being enacted in 25 states, which were upheld as constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court.

What is needed is for the working class to launch a mass struggle to win this demand. It’s time to fight to reverse the government policies which place the well-being of the financial institutions ahead of the welfare of the people.

Jerry Goldberg is an anti-foreclosure attorney and a leader in the Detroit-based Moratorium NOW! Coalition to Stop Foreclosures, Evictions and Utility Shutoffs. Articles copyright 1995-2010 Workers World. Verbatim copying and distribution of this entire article is permitted in any medium without royalty provided this notice is preserved.

In a surprising turn of events, the NYFed—no less—has gone after the Bank of America for its fraudulent mortgage business. Yes, the former home to Treasury Secretary Geithner–the best friend Wall Street has ever had–is now acting like the lapdog that bites the hand that feeds.

BofA has reacted as expected, trying to slap the little pipsqueak pet back into submission, announcing an end to its moratorium on foreclosure fraud and threatening to unleash its dark army of lawyers who are ready to do battle in the courts to maintain the myth that the junk banks securitized met required underwriting standards.

It is of course all high drama worthy of a mid-afternoon soap opera, with the Fed proclaiming dismay, nay, shock!, that banks sold it toxic waste. The over-acting would be hilarious if this were not such a serious issue.

In truth, it is all fraud, from start to end—from origination of the mortgages through the securitization, on to the duping of investors, and to the foreclosing on (mostly) innocent bystanding homeowners. The FBI warned of an epidemic of mortgage fraud in 2004, investigations demonstrate that 80% of the fraud is at the hands of lenders, and the fraud was no secret within the industry and within government long before the NYFed, USFed, and Treasury started bailing out the control fraud banks by purchasing their assets, guaranteeing their liabilities, lending against toxic waste, and buying their worthless equities—putting Uncle Sam on the hook in an amount estimated to total more than $20 trillion.

Meanwhile, the bank frauds have been kicking Americans out of their homes, manufacturing fake documents, and re-selling property to which they have no legitimate title.

But the past week has not been good for control fraud banks. State Attorneys General have gone after them, thumbing their collective noses at the weak-kneed Obama Administration that had done nothing more than to plead with the frauds to please be a tad bit nicer as they steal homes.

Judges have also gone after banks—noticing how amateurish the doctored and counterfeited documents looked, and they began to throw the bank plaintiffs out of court. We know that in many or most cases the banks do not have the borrowers’ notes—that are required in almost all states to take away someone’s home. Lots of bank officials and employees have committed crimes for which they can be prosecuted and for which they will serve real prison time.

All of this seems to have forced the Fed’s hand. Most bettors had put their money on Fannie and Freddie, not the Fed, to first call the bluff of the bank frauds. They have far more on the line—no doubt they are sitting on well over a trillion dollars worth of junk that does not meet the underwriting standards claimed by the securitizers. To be sure, they had taken some action, but it was the NYFed’s audacity that grabbed the headlines. Hey, there is, finally, the audacity of hope that President Obama used to talk about—funny that it should rest in the hands of the thoroughly compromised NYFed.

The banks, predictably, claim everything is fine. BofA supposedly spent a couple of hours during its self-imposed introspective moratorium to check through hundreds of thousands of foreclosures to ensure that all its procedures were appropriate. Surprise, surprise, it could not find a single mistake! Boy, these guys ARE good, even though they took over the mother of all control frauds, Countrywide Financial—inheriting its toxic waste. Yet, not one error! There is, again, a certain audacity there—perhaps one more in tune with the protect-Wall-Street-at-any-cost sort of song Karaoked so far at the White House.

Right—please sell me a Brooklyn bridge, or two, too. The fraud continues apace. The banks intend to continue to defraud both homeowners and investors in the toxic securities it sold.

How do we know it is all fraud?

Look, when lenders market “low doc”, “Ninja” and “Liar’s loans” (that accounted for half of all mortgages at the peak of the bubble), there is no question that the intent is to defraud investors. The appellations say it all. When lenders market “nuclear” hybrid loans with low teaser rates that blow up in two or three years, forcing borrowers into default, there is no question that the intent is to defraud borrowers. Fraud was the business model. Everyone in the industry knew that—from property appraisers to originators to credit raters to securitizers to insurers. Fraud, fraud, fraud. It is time to break out that F word and to use it liberally.

In an important piece by Felix Salmon (blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/10/13/the-enormous-mortgage-bond-scandal/), a “smoking gun” is produced. The big investment banks (Goldman, Bear, Citigroup, Merrill, Lehman, Morgan, Deutsche) used Clayton Holdings to do “third-party due diligence” on the mortgages that were pooled into securities. Note that this was most certainly NOT done to protect the investors who would buy the securities—rather it was to SCREW them. Clayton would “taste sample” some of the mortgages (5% to 35%), typically finding that a third or more did not meet underwriting standards. The investment bank would then kick those out and go back to the originator to renegotiate the price on the entire mortgage pool. Since the investment bank had proof that the pool did not meet standards, it would be able to get a better price.

Here’s the kicker. The investment bank did not, and did not want to, examine the whole pool in order to reject all the bad loans. Indeed, it WANTED a bad pool–a package of mortgages that contained many mortgages that did not meet underwriting standards–because this allowed it to reduce the price paid. Then it would tell the investment buyers of the securities “Oh, yes, we did due diligence, using an expert third party”. Of course the investment bank would not pass along the price discount it had obtained from the originator, and would not tell the buyer that the pool still contained an untold amount of junk mortgages. That would defeat the whole purpose of the third party “due diligence”—which was done only for the benefit of the investment bank in order to screw more profits out of the investor. Amazingly, the banks turned “due diligence” into a mechanism for fraud. These guys ARE audacious. They ARE good!

So here we are. The Fed, Fannie and Freddie, Pimco, and other big holders of the securities are now going after the banks. This is going to get really fun.

There is no better time to declare a bank holiday to try to unravel this mess. The banks will not survive the onslaught. The only question is how long do we really want to drag this out? Should we go through years of court battles while the economy suffers and Americans lose their homes? Or do we just get it over this weekend by shutting down the control frauds? Void all the fraudulent paper, let occupants keep their homes and negotiate fair “rents” in lieu of unaffordable mortgages. Swiftly deal with the fall-out. Pursue, prosecute, and incarcerate the guilty. Return the nation to the rule of law.

By L. Randall Wray

There was a strange debate about financial regulation in connection with various annual meetings of the international finance bodies in Washington, D.C. this weekend. The nominal debate was between the supposed hawks and doves on regulatory capital requirements. The most vocal doves spoke at the Institute of International Financial (IIF) meeting. Joseph Ackermann, Deutsche Bank’s CEO, is the IIF chairman. Germany, of course, at the behest of its banks, led the opposition within the Basel III process to raising capital requirements. Germany prevailed in the Basel III process, leading to a lengthy delay (until 2019) in returning nominal capital requirements to pre-Basel II levels.

(Basel II reduced capital requirements in Europe to farcical levels. Even those levels were fictional because most large banks massively overvalued their mortgage assets.)

Ackermann decried proposals to require systemically dangerous institutions (SDIs) to hold additional capital and proposals to speed up Basel III’s proposed increases in nominal capital levels. He argued that Lehman’s failure proved that interconnectedness, not simply size, contributed to causing global systemic risk. That is true, but his argument strongly supports requiring the SDIs to shrink to a level at which they would no longer pose systemic risks.

IIF released an interim study in June 2010 claiming that Basel III’s higher capital requirements would reduce signatory nations’ GDP by three percent. These studies are easy to create. If one assumes (1) that banks will be (really) profitable (as opposed to creating fictional accounting income and real losses) and (2) that the banks’ incentives and real successes will be unaffected by even exceptional leverage, then it follows that the greater the leverage the greater the bank lending and profitability. If one then assumes that greater bank loans will fund productive investments, thereby causing greater real growth (as opposed to inflating asset bubbles, which reduce real growth) and that this relationship is continuous (e.g., the more commercial real estate we finance in Atlanta the faster Atlanta’s economy will grow — forever), then extraordinary bank leverage must expand GDP. The optimal bank capital requirement is no requirement. None of these assumptions, conclusions, or predictions is valid, and we have just seen that the opposite can be true, but theoclassical economists’ dogmas have proven impervious to reality.

The capital hawks promptly responded to Ackermann. Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank President Thomas Hoenig argued that higher bank capital requirements were necessary for sustained economic growth. Hoenig’s remarks took aim at the central premise of self-regulation by markets – the concept of “private market discipline.”

“It [the markets] didn’t, it can’t and it won’t, [self-regulate]. The industry’s structure and incentives are now inconsistent with the market being the disciplinarian.”

The problem with this debate is that it has little to do with reality. The banking industry, in alliance with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, with Bernanke’s blessings (and with no opposition from the Obama administration), succeeded in using Congress to extort FASB to change the accounting rules so that banks do not have to recognize their real estate losses until they sell their bad assets. This makes the entire debate about nominal capital requirement surreal. Capital requirements are accounting concepts. If you pervert the accounting rules you render the capital requirements meaningless. This was done deliberately to subvert the Prompt Corrective Action law and to allow the continued payment of bonuses to bank senior officers. There is no meaningful capital requirement for the SDIs with enormous holdings of toxic mortgage assets.

The Fed’s “stress tests” deliberately ignored the losses on these assets. There are no real hawks at the Fed on capital requirements. Not a single senior Fed supervisor has the spine to even find the truth, much less close an insolvent SDI. Bernanke’s claim that they would have placed the huge, insolvent investment banks in receivership in 2008 if the Fed had possessed such resolution authority is preposterous. The banking regulators had ample authority to place insolvent federally insured banks that were SDIs in receivership but lacked the courage and integrity to do so.

The housing market stalled in mid-2006 and the uninsured mortgage bankers began failing in late 2006. The secondary market in nonprime mortgages collapsed in spring 2007. Years later, we have covered up the causes and extent of the crisis. This must end. GMAC’s, Fannie’s, and Freddie’s managers, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and the GAO should conduct three studies using data available at those enterprises and the Fed.

First, what is best estimate of the market value losses on liar’s loans, subprime loans, and CDOs held by Fannie, Freddie, and as collateral by the Fed? To what extent have those losses been recognized by the entities holding the assets? To what extent are Fannie, Freddie, and the Fed under collateralized? The Fed should demand additional collateral to ensure that it is not exposed to any loan losses.

Second, examine a sample of those assets’ loan and servicing files to determine the incidence of likely fraud that can be spotted simply through file reviews. This second study should determine the lender on each fraudulent loan and the professionals involved (e.g., the investment bankers that created the CDOs, the appraiser, the outside auditor, and the rating agency). This list should be used to prioritize administrative, civil, and criminal investigations. The list of likely fraudulent loans should be cross checked against list of criminal and SEC referrals to determine which entities are failing to make referrals. The GAO should formally alert the relevant regulatory agencies about which entities are not making adequate referrals. The entities conducting the study should make criminal and SEC referrals where others have failed to do so. Fannie and Freddie should be directed by FHFA to put back fraudulent mortgages to the lenders/CDO packagers.

Third, review the loan and servicing files of a sample of GMAC’s mortgage servicing portfolio and its foreclosures during the first half of 2010. Determine the extent of likely mortgage fraud for the mortgages serviced by GMAC (and follow the steps recommended above). Determine the extent of GMAC files that lack adequate documentation to ensure the ability to conduct a valid foreclosure. Review a sample of the loan and servicing files for mortgage instruments that the Fed has taken as collateral. Determine the extent to which the file deficiencies would pose difficulties for the Fed if it sought to foreclose on mortgage assets it holds as collateral. Review a sample of GMAC foreclosures to determine the extent to which such foreclosures were invalid, unethical, or unlawful because of defects in the files or foreclosure processes used by GMAC or its agents. If the sample reveals material problems direct GMAC to cure any defects or abuses.

The fact that four years after the onset of greatest financial crisis of our lives neither the industry nor the regulators have systematically studied these basic facts essential to addressing this crisis and avoiding future crises is a demonstration of how destructive the cover up has been. We should not be forced to spell out and mandate the studies that any competent, honest decision maker would have begun nearly four years ago. The fact that Treasury Secretary Geithner, a co-architect of the cover up (with Paulson and Bernanke), is engaged in a successful propaganda campaign premised on the facially absurd claim that the entire banking crisis was resolved at a taxpayer cost of roughly $50 billion is a testament to the continued debasement of not only the Department of the Treasury, but also too much of the financial press.

Bill Black is the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One and an associate professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He spent years working on regulatory policy and fraud prevention as Executive Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention, Litigation Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Deputy Director of the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, among other positions.

Bill writes a column for Benzinga every Monday. His other academic articles, congressional testimony, and musings about the financial crisis can be found at his Social Science Research Network author page and at the blog New Economic Perspectives.

* Analysis of available law enforcement and industry resources indicates that the top ten mortgage fraud areas are California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Texas, and Utah. Other areas significantly affected by mortgage fraud include Arizona, Colorado, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.
* There is a strong correlation between mortgage fraud and loans which result in default and foreclosure.

Emerging Schemes

* Recent statistics suggest that escalating foreclosures provide criminals with the opportunity to exploit and defraud vulnerable homeowners seeking financial guidance.
* Perpetrators are exploiting the home equity line of credit (HELOC) application process to conduct mortgage fraud, check fraud, and potentially money laundering-related activity.

FBI and Industry Respond to Escalating Mortgage Fraud

* The FBI is proactively working with the mortgage industry in an effort to curb mortgage fraud crimes. The FBI signed a memorandum of agreement with the MBA to promote the FBI’s Mortgage Fraud Warning Notice.

Introduction

The Prieston Group, a risk management solutions provider that administers an insurance product covering losses due to fraud and misrepresentation, calculated that losses attributed to mortgage fraud will most likely reach $4.2 billion for 2006. This figure does not take into account another estimated $1.2 billion spent on fraud prevention tools. – The Prieston Group, 2006 Data, 16 February 2007,and 2 April 2007.

Mortgage Fraud is defined as the intentional misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission by an applicant or other interested parties, relied on by a lender or underwriter to provide funding for, to purchase, or to insure a mortgage loan. Although no central repository collects all mortgage fraud complaints, statistics from multiple sources indicate that mortgage fraud is on the rise. Some industry explanations for this increase point to recent high mortgage loan origination volumes that strained quality control efforts, the persistent desire of mortgage lenders to hasten the mortgage loan process, the escalation of home prices in recent years, and the introduction of non-traditional loans which contain fewer quality control restraints such as low documentation and no documentation loans1.

Mortgage loan fraud is divided into two categories: fraud for property and fraud for profit. Fraud for property/housing entails minor misrepresentations by the applicant solely for the purpose of purchasing a property for a primary residence. This scheme usually involves a single loan. Although applicants may embellish income and conceal debt, their intent is to repay the loan. Fraud for profit, however, often involves multiple loans and elaborate schemes perpetrated to gain illicit proceeds from property sales. It is this second category that is of most concern to law enforcement and the mortgage industry. Gross misrepresentations concerning appraisals and loan documents are common in fraud for profit schemes and participants are frequently paid for their participation. Recent events likely resulted in an increase in mortgage fraud as higher housing prices tempted borrowers to commit fraud for property in order to qualify for a mortgage loan. Also, mortgage fraud perpetrators likely seized the opportunity to take advantage of the relaxed lending practices to commit fraud for profit.

The most common form of mortgage fraud is illegal property flipping which entails false appraisals and other fraudulent loan documents (see figure 1). Combating mortgage fraud effectively requires the cooperation of law enforcement and industry entities. No single regulatory agency is charged with monitoring this crime. The FBI, Department of Housing and Urban Development-Office of Inspector General (HUD-OIG), Internal Revenue Service, Postal Inspection Service, and state and local agencies are among those investigating mortgage fraud.

Mortgage fraud is a relatively low-risk, high-yield criminal activity that tempts many. However, according a May 2006 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) report, finance-related occupations, including accountants, mortgage brokers, and lenders, were the most common suspect occupations associated with reported mortgage fraud2. Perpetrators in these occupations are familiar with the mortgage loan process and therefore know how to exploit vulnerabilities in the system.

Victims of mortgage fraud may include borrowers, mortgage industry entities, and those living in the neighborhoods affected by mortgage fraud. Lenders are plagued with high foreclosure costs, broker commissions, reappraisals, attorney fees, rehabilitation costs, and other related expenses when a mortgage fraud is committed3. As properties affected by mortgage fraud are sold at artificially inflated prices, properties in surrounding neighborhoods also become artificially inflated. When property values increase, property taxes increase as well. Legitimate homeowners also find it difficult to sell their homes as surrounding properties affected by fraud deteriorate.

During boom periods, high mortgage loan volume impacts expedited quality control efforts which often focus on production. Therefore, perpetrators may submit loans based on fraudulent information anticipating that the bogus information will be overlooked. On the other hand, loan officers, brokers, and others in the industry are paid by commission and may be tempted to approve questionable loans when the housing market is down to maintain current levels of income.

Analysis of mortgage originations indicates a decrease in demand. As a result of the declining housing market, mortgage fraud perpetrators may take advantage of eager loan originators attempting to generate loans for commission. Mortgage loan originations, including purchases and refinances declined during 2006 across the United States. The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) estimates that mortgage loan originations will reach $2.28 trillion during 2007 (see figure 2)4. According to an MBA December 2006 report, total home sales during 2006 decreased by approximately 10 percent from 2005 sales. New home sales declined by 17 percent and existing home sales dipped by 8 percent. In response to a decrease in demand for housing, builders reduced single-family starts (through November 2006) which were 14 percent lower than during the same time period in 2005. The MBA estimates that the oversupply of housing will continue to affect new home construction, home sales, and home prices until mid-20075.

Top Areas for Mortgage Fraud

Data was compiled and analyzed from law enforcement and industry sources to determine those areas of the country most affected by mortgage fraud during 2006. Information from the FBI, HUD-OIG, FinCEN, Mortgage Asset Research Institute (MARI), Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), RealtyTrac Inc. (foreclosure statistics), and Radian Guaranty Inc., indicate that the top ten mortgage fraud areas for 2006 were California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Texas, and Utah. Other areas significantly affected by mortgage fraud include Arizona, Colorado, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia (see figure 3).

Analysis of available information indicates that mortgage fraud is most concentrated in the north central region of the United States. The north central region is followed by the southeast and west regions.

Regional analysis of FBI pending mortgage fraud-related investigations as of FY 2006 reveals that the north central region of the United States led the nation with the most pending investigations. The north central region was followed by the southeast, west, south central, and northeast, respectively (see figure 4).

The aggregate amount of ARM loans containing fraudulent misrepresentations is unknown. However, since mortgage fraud perpetrators hope to inflate the value of their properties and quickly sell them, they would likely gravitate towards mortgage loans that offered low and short-term interest rates such as those offered by ARMs.

Delinquency, Default, and Foreclosure: Potential Fraud Indicators

Mortgage loans based on fraudulent information usually result in delinquency, default, or foreclosure in a bear market. According to the MBA, both delinquency and foreclosures rates increased during 2006 and were largely concentrated in adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) loans, especially sub-prime ARMs. This is partly attributable to the recent rise in interest rates, placing a strain on ARMs borrowers6.

BasePoint Analytics, a fraud analytics company, analyzed more than 3 million loans and found that between 30 and 70 percent of early payment defaults (EPDs) are linked to significant misrepresentations in the original loan applications7. Radian Guaranty, Inc. is a leading provider of mortgage insurance which protects lenders against loan default. Of the top ten states Radian Guaranty Inc. ranked highest for mortgage fraud, seven of them also ranked in the company’s top ten for EPDs. This suggests that EPDs are a good mortgage fraud indicator.

During 2006 there were more than 1.2 million foreclosure filings nationally, which represents a 42 percent increase from 2005 figures. The foreclosure rate for 2006 was one foreclosure filing for every 92 households8. Foreclosures for 2006 surpassed foreclosures for 2005 during every month of the year9.

Foreclosure Fraud

Recent statistics suggest that escalating foreclosures provide criminals with the opportunity to exploit and defraud vulnerable homeowners seeking financial guidance. The perpetrators convince homeowners that they can save their homes from foreclosure through deed transfers and the payment of up-front fees. This “foreclosure rescue” often involves a manipulated deed process that results in the preparation of forged deeds. In extreme instances, perpetrators may sell the home or secure a second loan without the homeowners’ knowledge, stripping the property’s equity for personal enrichment.

While foreclosure scams vary, they may be used in combination with other fraudulent schemes. For instance, perpetrators may view foreclosure-rescue scams as a new method for fraudulently acquiring properties to facilitate illegal property-flipping and equity-skimming.

Home Equity Lines of Credit

According to a DOJ press release, Mi Su Yi and her husband, Paul Amorello, were sentenced in California in July 2006 for operating a $3 million bust-out scheme involving business lines of credit and HELOCs. The couple accessed lines of credit that had been obtained by others and paid the balances with worthless checks. They subsequently withdrew cash from the lines of credit before the checks were returned for insufficient funds. The couple laundered their proceeds through bank accounts opened under three false identities. In an attempt to avoid detection, the couple deposited cash amounts of less than $10,000 into these accounts. -US DOJ, “New Jersey Residents Sentenced to Prison for Running a $3 Million ‘Bust-Out’ Scheme,” Press Release, 25 July 2006, available at http://www.usdoj.gov

Individuals and criminal groups are exploiting the home equity line of credit (HELOC) application process to conduct multiple-funding mortgage fraud schemes, check fraud schemes, and potentially money laundering-related activity. HELOCs differ from standard home equity loans because the homeowner may borrow against the line of credit over a period of time using a checkbook or credit card. HELOCs are aggressively marketed by lenders as an easy, fast, and inexpensive means to obtain funds. HELOC funds are normally withdrawn on an as-needed basis to conduct home repairs or to pay bills, but fraud perpetrators may withdraw the entire amount within a short time period. Lenders typically focus on property equity prior to funding HELOCs. As such, many lenders do not demand a full property appraisal or a full property title search.

Perpetrators apply for multiple HELOCs to different lending institutions for a single property within a short time period. Prior to providing the funding, lenders conduct searches to determine if the property is encumbered by a lien. However, liens on a property may not be recorded for several days or months and thus cannot be immediately verified. Consequently, lenders do not discover that they hold a third, fourth, or fifth lien on a property (rather than the expected second lien) until later. The money obtained from the multiple HELOCs totals more than the original property purchase price, exceeding the out-of-pocket expenses incurred to secure the property.

Perpetrators conducting check fraud schemes may manipulate HELOC accounts and cause lenders to incur losses. For example, a perpetrator secures a HELOC and withdraws the entire allotted amount. A fraudulent check is then used to pay the balance owed on the HELOC. However, the perpetrator quickly withdraws the check amount from the HELOC before the bank realizes the check is worthless. When the check is returned for insufficient funds, the line of credit surpasses its maximum limit and the lender experiences a loss. HELOC accounts have also been used in common check frauds where perpetrators stole HELOC checks, fraudulently completed them, and deposited the funds into their own personal accounts.

HELOCs may also be used as a means of depositing and withdrawing laundered proceeds to further conceal the original funding source. As long as withdrawals from the HELOC do not exceed the line of credit limit, payments deposited into the account may be withdrawn later.

FBI and Industry Respond to Escalating Mortgage Fraud

The FBI is proactively working with the mortgage industry in an effort to curb mortgage fraud crimes. On March 8, 2007, the FBI signed a memorandum of agreement with the MBA to promote the FBI’s Mortgage Fraud Warning Notice. The Notice states that it is illegal to make any false statement regarding income, assets, debt or matters of identification, or to willfully inflate property value to influence the action of a financial institution. Under the agreement, the MBA and the FBI will make the notice available to mortgage lenders to use voluntarily as a means of educating consumers and mortgage professionals of the penalties and consequences of mortgage fraud.10

The scope of foreclosure fraud may not be limited to GMAC and not just to JPMorgan Chase; it may be every bank you can think of, including mortgages held by government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Any bank whose foreclosures have been handled by a law firm specializing in foreclosure services — a “foreclosure mill” — may be affected.

A paralegal at the foreclosure mill of David Stern gave a deposition to Florida’s Attorney General Bill McCollum’s office indicating that virtually every affidavit, assignment or other sworn document coming out of that firm is faked.

It’s over 100 pages, and it will curl your hair. Two thousand foreclosure files were processed each day by just this one firm and the entire lot appears to have been a sham. Go read the transcript for yourself. If this happened at one foreclosure mill, it’s hard to believe this wasn’t happening at all the other foreclosure mills.

Ohio’s attorney general is suing for $25,000 in fines for each fraudulent affidavit; at this rate, he could solve his state’s budget gap.

By the way, Florida’s assistant attorneys general conducted a very nice line of questioning; Mr. McCollum owes them a pat on the back. The states of Ohio and Florida are showing how it’s done, the rest of you states’ attorneys general and U.S. Attorneys need to get on the stick.

By: Cynthia Kouril

FDIC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Office of Inspector General,
Office of Evaluations,
3501 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22226-3500
DATE: February 4, 2010

SUBJECT: The FDIC’s Loan Modification Program

This report presents the results of our evaluation of the FDIC’s Loan Modification Program (LMP). In 2008, the FDIC initiated a systematic and streamlined approach to loan modifications at IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB (lndyMac), in order to place borrowers into affordable, long-term mortgages while achieving an improved return for bankers and investors compared to the results of foreclosure. In February 2009, President Obama tasked the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) with program responsibility for developing and implementing uniform guidance for loan modifications across the mortgage industry based, in part, on the FDIC’s work at IndyMac. Since November 2008, the FD IC has required most purchasers of failed bank assets to implement the FDIC’s LMP, Treasury’s Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), or some other loan modification program acceptable to the FDIC.

BACKGROUND

In 2008, the FDIC developed the LMP after taking over as conservator for IndyMac to achieve improved value for the IndyMac Federal conservatorship by turning troubled loans into performing loans and, thereby, avoiding unnecessary and costly foreclosures. The FDIC LMP requires that a successful candidate for loan modification result in a (1) positive net present value (NPV) as opposed to a foreclosure option and (2) monthly payment representing no more than 31 percent of the borrower’s gross monthly income, known as the front-end debt-to-income ratio. The FDIC LMP utilizes a “waterfall” approach to reach the 31-percent ratio, by first lowering the borrower’s interest rate, then extending the term of the loan not to exceed 40 years, and finally forbearing principal to the end of the loan period. FDIC officials have noted that a critical characteristic of the FDIC LMP process is that it has to be straightforward and efficient in order to modify a large number of “at-risk” mortgages in a short period of time.

In February 2009, the Obama Administration announced The Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan, a $75 billion federal program designed to provide for a sweeping loan modification program targeted at borrowers who are at risk of foreclosure. The plan tasked Treasury with developing and implementing uniform guidance for the government’s loan modification efforts. Treasury announced its HAMP guidelines on March 4, 2009, which built on the work of Congressional leaders and the FDIC’s LMP. Treasury’s HAMP uses the FDIC LMP 31-percent “waterfall” process and the NPV test. However, HAMP also provides various incentive payments to the loan servicer and borrower for achieving sustainable loan modifications.

Under Treasury’s HAMP, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) serves as the financial agent and fulfills the role of administrator, record-keeper, and paying agent for the program. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) is the compliance agent for the program and is responsible for ensuring that participating servicers comply with Treasury’s guidelines.

As of August 2009, Treasury had signed Servicer Participation Agreements (SPA) with 38 servicers, who, along with 2,300 servicers of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans, account for more than 85 percent of the mortgage market.1 In an August 2009 report, Treasury stated that more than 230,000 trial modifications had started and that the program was on pace to help 3 to 4 million homeowners over the next 3 years.

NEWARK, NJ—An East Stroudsburg, Penn., man pleaded guilty today to a wire fraud charge in connection with the $136 million fraud scheme that bankrupted Pine Brook, N.J.-based U.S. Mortgage Corp. and its subsidiary, CU National Mortgage, LLC, U.S. Attorney Paul J. Fishman announced.

Leroy Hayden, 47, the servicing manager of U.S. Mortgage from 2004 through Jan. 28, 2009, pleaded guilty before U.S. District Judge Katharine S. Hayden to one count of wire fraud conspiracy.

According to documents filed in this and related cases and statements made in federal court:

During the relevant period, Leroy Hayden conspired with Michael J. McGrath, Jr.—then the president and controlling shareholder of closely-held U.S. Mortgage—and several others to fraudulently sell Fannie Mae hundreds of loans belonging to various credit unions. He also provided numerous reports to credit unions falsely stating that loans that had been sold were still in the credit unions’ portfolios, and falsified records, at McGrath’s direction, to conceal these fraudulent sales. Leroy Hayden also admitted that he modified data in U.S. Mortgage’s servicing system to help carry out the scheme.

The pace of the fraudulent sales increased during 2008 and early 2009. On Jan. 27, 2009, dozens of law enforcement agents executed a search warrant at U.S. Mortgage and CU National’s Pine Brook headquarters. In the following weeks, U.S. Mortgage and CU National commenced bankruptcy proceedings.

McGrath pleaded guilty on June 12, 2009, to mail fraud, wire fraud and money laundering conspiracy charges, admitting that he hatched his scheme to prop up his company. He further admitted that he fraudulently sold hundred of loans belonging to various credit unions to Fannie Mae and used the proceeds to fund U.S. Mortgage’s operations, his personal investments, and investments he made on U.S. Mortgage’s behalf. McGrath is scheduled to be sentenced on July 6, 2010, before Judge Hayden.

The charge to which Leroy Hayden pleaded guilty carries a maximum potential penalty of five years in prison and a maximum fine of $250,000, or twice the amount of loss suffered by the victims of the conspiracy. His sentence is also expected to include restitution to the victims of the conspiracy, presently estimated at $136 million. His sentencing is scheduled for July 27, 2010.

U.S. Attorney Fishman said, “Frauds of this magnitude don’t happen without someone to cook the books and push the paper. Leroy Hayden had to decide whether to go along with his boss’ fraud or alert law enforcement to the scheme. Unfortunately, he made the criminal choice, and he answered for that choice today.”

Fishman credited Postal Inspectors of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, under the direction of Postal Inspector in Charge David Collins; Special Agents of the IRS Criminal Investigation Division, under the direction of Special Agent in Charge William P. Offord; Special Agents of the FBI, under the direction of Special Agent in Charge Michael B. Ward; and Special Agents of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Office of Inspector General, under the direction of Special Agent in Charge Joseph Clarke, for their investigation leading to this guilty plea. Fishman also thanked the U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General for assisting in the investigation.

The government is represented by Assistant U.S. Attorney Mark E. Coyne of the U.S. Attorney’s Office Economic Crimes Unit.

This case was brought in coordination with President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general, and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes.

For anyone who assumed that the toughened real-estate appraisal rules imposed on the mortgage market last year would mean less monkey business in home valuations, here’s a shocker: Fraudulent appraisals soared in 2009, according to a lending-industry study released this week, and they now represent the fastest-growing form of home loan fraud.

The Mortgage Asset Research Institute found that, while overall incidences of loan fraud rose last year by 7 percent, the share of frauds involving property valuations increased 50 percent. MARI, a service of data company LexisNexis, collects information from more than 600 wholesale mortgage lenders who account for the vast bulk of loans originated in the country. Once a year, MARI reports its findings on fraud trends to the Mortgage Bankers Association.

Although the biggest source of mortgage fraud last year was intentional misinformation submitted by borrowers on their applications — bogus Social Security numbers or data on income, employment and assets — distorted valuations came in second. In previous annual reports, appraisal problems were far less prominent. As recently as 2006, just 16 percent of all mortgage fraud cases involved skewed property valuations. By 2008, 22 percent of reported fraud involved bad appraisals, whereas last year, that number rose to 33 percent, according to MARI.

The surge in appraisal shenanigans came despite the nationwide imposition of restrictions last year that were designed to limit interference in real estate valuations and to improve their accuracy. As of May 1, 2009, mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac prohibited loan officers and brokers from selecting appraisers, and effectively encouraged lenders to use “appraisal management companies” that assign appraisers from their own networks nationwide.

The new rules, known as the , stoked immediate controversy among mortgage brokers, appraisers, home builders and real-estate brokers. Critics charged that because management companies pay rock-bottom compensation to appraisers — often as little as $175 for an assignment that previously made them $350 to $450 — the new rules encouraged the use of inexperienced people, who frequently were not familiar with local market conditions.

Critics also charged that management companies forced appraisers to turn in their work within unrealistically short deadlines, even if they had to cut corners on quality and thoroughness.

Citing widespread evidence submitted by members about lowball and incompetent appraisals, the National Association of Realtors waged a lobbying campaign to persuade Congress to put the rules imposed by Fannie and Freddie on ice for 18 months. Congress has not acted on the matter.

Bill Garber, government affairs director for the Appraisal Institute, the largest trade group representing the industry, said the surge in bad appraisals last year “demonstrates what happens when lenders hire appraisers solely based on low prices and quick turnaround times.”

“This should send a loud signal to lenders to hire ethical and competent appraisers” if they want to avoid fraud in their loans, Garber said.

Freddie Mac spokesman Brad German offered a different view. Because the MARI study made no specific reference to the rule changes by Freddie and Fannie or to the use of appraisal-management companies, “we see no connection between [the code] and appraisal fraud.” Fannie Mae officials declined to comment.

Jeff Schurman, executive director of the Title/Appraisal Vendor Management Association, which represents the appraisal management industry, had no immediate comment on the findings, pending a review of the data.

The fraud report covered every major type of valuation method lenders use to underwrite mortgages, including traditional appraisals, electronic valuations and broker price opinions supplied by real estate agents, among others.

The biggest game fraudsters play: messing with or fabricating the information on “comparables” that form the basis of most appraisal reports. Rather than selecting nearby properties with broadly similar physical characteristics and recently recorded selling prices, bad appraisers typically come up with houses and characteristics that better fit their purposes.

Sometimes, they just left out the negatives. A hypothetical example: The property they were valuing was located near a busy and noisy highway or railroad tracks that would normally depress its value significantly. No problem. Poof — the appraisal report could omit those issues.

What did fabrications like these achieve? Primarily custom-tailored property valuations that were often off-base by 15 to 30 percent or more and allowed the sales contract and loan application to be approved. This, in turn, left lenders holding the bag when the mortgage went sour, raising losses and making the national foreclosure crisis even worse.

Kenneth Harney, WSJ

While a lot will be written about the U.S. government’s takeover of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, very little is likely to be said about the role real estate and mortgage fraud played in the run-up to the takeovers themselves.

With real estate fraud still labeled by the FBI as the “fastest-growing white collar crime,” and with a high percentage of mortgage loans containing overwhelming evidence of fraudulent claims, one would think that now would be the time that interviews with Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. would touch upon the F-word. Sadly though, it’s business as usual at all of the national media outlets covering this story. It’s as if they don’t even know to ask about real estate fraud, which of course is utterly insane:

At the very beginning of the current mortgage meltdown and resulting foreclosure epidemic, a small group of people–myself included–pointed out the true main cause of this mess–fraud. Most people I talked with either didn’t understand or disagreed, including a lot real estate professionals and–not surprising–members the national media. Most still think today’s mess had more to do with irresponsible lending on the part of consumers, the popularity of poorly conceived mortgage loan products, and a long overdue market correction in property values.

The truth then as it is now, is that fraud is at the very root of the problems we’re experiencing.

Unfortunately, getting the national media or the real estate and mortgage industry to admit to this fact is nearly impossible. For the national media, it appears to be too easy for them to just tell the story as it is being fed to them by the government (in other words, they’re either lazy or don’t have the resources to dig just a little deeper). And for the real estate and mortgage industry, well, they just have too much to lose by admitting the truth. If fraud is a proven contributing factor to a borrower’s defaulting on a loan, the mortgage lender is required to buy the bad loan back from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or the Wall Street Firms who sold the loan to investors.

Fraud has been and continues to be so rampant that acknowledging its role in this mess would lead to the mortgage banks having to buy back billions of dollars in bad loans, which they simply cannot afford to do.

The current state of denial about fraud is only making the problem worse. Until the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the real estate and mortgage loan industry all wake up and admit to the problem, the fraudsters will be free to continue in their ways with no thought of the future mess they’re causing.

Senior White House officials, along with top brass from the Federal Reserve, met earlier this evening with executives from Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae and reportedly told them that the U.S. government is preparing to place the two government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) under federal control. The plan, as outlined by The New York Times, would place both companies into a conservatorship, which means that their boards of directors and top executives would be replaced and shareholders would almost entirely be wiped out, but that the GSEs would continue operations with the federal government standing behind their debt.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are privately owned but publicly chartered, and are considered critical to the stability of the U.S. housing and mortgage markets. Their current troubles have threatened to worsen the bursting of the housing bubble, which along with significant levels of fraud, has led to a surge in foreclosures.

The U.S. Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve recently took steps to increase confidence in both organizations, including granting them access to low-interest loans and removing the prohibition on the Treasury to purchase the GSEs’ stock. Despite these efforts, in the last year alone, publicly held shares of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have fallen more than 75%.

Just last week, Fannie Mae announced that the company’s chief financial officer, Stephen Swad, was being replaced by David C. Hisey, and that former Executive Vice President of Capital Markets, Peter Niculescu, would take on an expanded role as the new Chief Business Officer to replace Robert J. Levin, who is retiring as Executive Vice President and Chief Business Officer. The company also announced Michael Shaw would be appointed as the new chief risk officer and Daniel Mudd, the company’s embattled president and chief executive officer, would remain in place after a vote of confidence from the Board of Directors.

Tonight’s news of a government takeover comes just hours after the Mortgage Bankers Association released its latest National Delinquency Survey, which shows that the rate of U.S. home mortgages overdue or in foreclosure rose again in the second quarter. Among mortgages for one- to four-family homes, nearly 10% are currently at least one month overdue or in foreclosure.

From The New York Times:

Just five weeks ago, President Bush signed a law to give the administration the authority to inject billions of dollars into the companies through investments or loans. In proposing the legislation, Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. said that he had no plan to provide loans or investments, and that merely giving the government the authority to backstop the companies would provide a strong shot of confidence to the markets. But the thin capital reserves that have kept the two companies afloat have continued to erode as the housing market has steadily declined and the number of foreclosures has soared.

As their problems have deepened — and the marketplace has come to expect some sort of government rescue — both companies have found it difficult to raise new capital to absorb future losses. In recent weeks, Mr. Paulson has been reaching out to foreign governments that hold billions of dollars of Fannie and Freddie securities to reassure them that the United States stands behind the companies.